We ask whether central banks adjust their policy rates in response to macroeconomic developments and what these adjustments signal about ination expectations. Following Taylor (1993) and Henderson and McKibbin (1993) , economists think of the conduct of monetary policy as a systematic, rulebased response to information about key macroeconomic conditions, rather than as a period-by-period optimization problem. As summarized in the New Keynesian paradigm by Galí (2018) , central banks are expected to adjust the policy rate suciently strongly in response to variations in ination and output, with the primacy of ination stabilization thought to be the rst-best policy. 1 Monetary tightening can result either in a vertical shift of the yield curve or in a movement in the short-term rate only, either attening or steepening the yield curve. Most central banks have adopted, or are in the process of adopting, such frameworks. Empirically, Ang and others (2011) shown that the U.S. yield curve provides a powerful evidence of such a transmission mechanism. But do other central banks do what they say?
And does the monetary regime play a role?
We explore the adherence to data-and rule-based monetary policy empirically by comparing key macroeconomic innovations with changes in the yield curve. First, we compute the annual rate of ination, the output gap, and the real exchange rate gap, estimate the level shift and slope shift of the yield curve (the rst two latent factors) using the Christensen, Diebold, and Rudebusch (2011) methodology, and calculate the corresponding passthrough from the macroeconomic variables to the latent factors. Second, we estimate country-specic vector autoregressions (VAR) with the latent factors and macroeconomic variables, and control for the global nancial and business cycle. Our approach broadly follows Ang and others (2011).
The key added value of the paper is the empirical result conrming systematic adherence to the rule-based policy paradigm in a broad range of monetary policy regimes. We nd that ination and the output and real exchange rate gaps coincide with or precede, policy changes and are correlated with them. Or, to put it dierently, we nd that monetary policy in the sample institutions is generally predictable and data-driven. Furthermore, nding a link between macroeconomic developments and the slope factor could be an indication of anchored ination expectations. 1 In addition, some central banks have used the policy rate systematically to target a certain level or variance of the exchange rate (Frankel, 2019) .
The results are regime-dependent. The three advanced ination-targeting central banks in our sample are found to react systematically to ination and output innovations, with the reactions showing as both level and slope changes. Our ndings are also broadly similar for evolving ination-targeting countries, although the links to latent factors are somewhat less systematic and these countries pay attention to their exchange rate developments as well. Surprisingly, we nd little evidence that ination expectations are better anchored in advanced than in evolving ination-targeting countries the share of reactions through the level and slope factors is similar. The story is dierent for central banks that either target monetary aggregates or follow multiple objectives: interest rate setting appears to be only weakly related to the key macroeconomic variables.
In the remainder of the paper we proceed as follows. First, we outline our methodology. Second, we describe our sample. Third, we present our results and discuss robustness checks. Fourth, we sketch policy implications. The nal section concludes. Data, detailed results, and robustness checks are presented in the Appendices. 2 Methodology and Hypotheses
Rule-based monetary policy employs readily observable macroeconomic variables in easy-to-understand policy reaction functions, (Al-Mashat and others 2018). Regarding the macroeconomic variables, the primacy of price stability is expressed in the form of an ination target, output stabilization is measured as the deviation of real GDP from its steady state, that is, the output gap, and the external stability of the currency is measured by the real ex- 3 On the other hand, the intuitive focus on the policy rate and other ocial communications may lead to spurious results, as these can be disconnected from short-term interbank market, longer-term bond, and lending rates due to inecient liquidity operations and the impact of ination expectations. In addition, policy rates carry little information under a strict monetary-targeting regime, under which the eective policy rate is the interbank rate. Following Ang and Piazzesi (2003) , rather than monitoring the policy rate in an ad hoc policy reaction function, we thus prefer to focus on the whole yield curve, distinguishing between its level and slope shifts.
The textbook view of the term structure of interest rates, Mishkin (1995) , suggests that monetary policy innovations, as well as other domestic and external developments, result in level and slope shifts of the yield curve, with the relative pass-through to these two factors depending on whether ination expectations are anchored or not. In countries where ination expectations are anchored, monetary policy innovations are predominantly propagated through changes in the slope of the yield curve. Agents believe that the policy innovations are designed so as to return the rate of ination to the target at the end of the monetary transmission period and, hence, policy tightening and loosening are seen as both credible and relatively short-lived events. Consequently, there is little need for an adjustment in long-run interest rates and most of the policy-related action happen along the short end of the yield curve through a attening/steepening of its slope (the dashed line in Figure 1 ). 4 Such a stylized view was found to hold for the U.S. for most of the sample period of 1952-2007 by Ang and others (2011) .
In contrast, in countries where ination expectations are linked to past ination and/or where actual ination is volatile, agents do not know either 3 For example, see the Letter of Intent attached to the Republic of Tanzania Policy Support Instrument documents.
Available at https://www.imf.org/~/media/Files/Publications/CR/2018/cr1811.ashx. 4 Following the term structure theory of interest rates, the long-term interest rate with a maturity of k months, i k t , is a function of all expected future policy rates. Hence,
is the policy rate with a monthly maturity and tprem is a time premium. Using the Fisher denition of the real interest rate, the equation can be rewritten as
+E t π t+i k + tprem, where π stands for ination andr for the natural rate of interest. The rule-based, data-driven policy paradigm denes the expected reactions of policy rates and various short-and long-term interest rates to current and future macroeconomic developments. 5 A positive and unexpected ination 5 The authorities may not have the correct macroeconomic data at the time of the decision, of course. Orphanides (2001) demonstrated that U.S. Fed real-time policy recommendations dier considerably from those obtained with ex post revised data. The magnitude of the informational problems is likely to be larger in emerging and low-income countries. Needless to say, it is generally accepted that there have been important changes in the conduct of monetary policy before and after the Great Ination episode, see Clarida, shock requires policy tightening through a hike in the short-term rate, resulting in either an upward level shift of the yield curve, or a atter yield curve, or a combination of the two. 6 Hence, one would expect to nd a positive correlation between ination and the rst latent factor, and a negative correlation between ination and the second latent factor, or both correlations.
Positive demand shocks as drivers of the output gap also imply higher interest rates to prevent future ination. If the central bank additionally uses the interest rate to systematically manage the exchange rate, following depreciation one should again observe policy tightening. We see three reasons why our focus on contemporaneous and past innovations should suce. First, to test whether the expected macroeconomic data lead today's interest rate developments, we would need ocially published forecasts of the relevant macroeconomic variables their realized observations in t+i are biased to the extent they reect the impact of current-period policy decisions. Such forecasts are unavailable for all but a few advanced-country central banks. Second, in our view, the various pass-through mechanisms are neither fast nor very forward-looking, as central banks tend to smooth their policy rate paths in line with the wait and see approach. Third, ination and output the two key elements of a typical policy reaction function exhibit strong serial correlation. Hence, we believe that a contemporaneous link between macroeconomic innovations and the latent factors is a fairly good approximation of a forward-looking monetary policy.
We test the transmission using VAR-based impulse responses and check the robustness of our ndings with sample bivariate correlations. To this end, Galí, and Gertler (2000) . 6 This policy reaction is certainly true for demand-driven inationary developments. It could be argued that credible ination targeters tend to ignore short-lived supply-driven ination shocks and react only to the second-round eects thereof. For simplicity, we ignore the supply vs. demand distinction. 7 By expressing the exchange rate in domestic currency terms, a positive rst dierence is equivalent to currency depreciation. The real exchange rate is calculated as the log of the nominal exchange rate plus the foreign price level minus the domestic price level. 3 Data Issues
Identication of the latent factors in emerging market countries (EMCs) and low-income countries (LICs) carries unique challenges. Government securities are rarely traded on secondary markets, primary issue data often contain gaps; some central banks provide liquidity at rates dierent from the policy rates, and so on. Ideally, we would have liked to estimate zero-coupon yield equivalents for bonds with coupons, but these are regularly available for advanced countries only, and estimation thereof for EMCs and LICs is hindered by a lack of benchmark issues. Furthermore, interest rate series in all countries have unit roots attributable to their disinationary, or in some cases inationary, periods that are dicult to remove see Bulí°and Vl£ek (forthcoming) for a discussion. The quality of national account data varies as well.
Sample Countries
We are primarily interested in testing the data-driven and rule-based policy paradigm in the widest possible range of monetary regimes, given data limitations, as opposed to re-examining data-rich U.S. or other advanced countries.
Our macroeconomically and regime diverse sample contains 16 countries and the country selection is driven primarily by yield data availability, with the length of the country series ranging from seven years (Rwanda) to 24 years (Sweden), see Table 1 . Such sample periods are much shorter than that used by Ang and others (2011), however, we see this as an advantage: we don't need to worry much about regime switches and time-varying loading coecients.
Our diverse sample contains seven emerging market countries (EMCs) are 8 The ACs all practice inationforecast targeting (Svensson, 1997) , and ve out of the 11 countries in the EMC/LIC group are identied as ination targeters as well.
Macroeconomic Developments
The 
The Yield Curve
Only advanced and some emerging market central banks use the policy rate as an eective rate for liquidity operations most LICs have occasionally provided liquidity at rates dierent from their ocial policy rates (see Berg and others 2013). Hence, we use the de jure policy rate only if the bank has used it consistently as a policy instrument and the interbank rates have 8 We purposefully avoid re-examining the U.S., countries with large-scale unconventional monetary policy (Japan), or members of currency unions (Euro area). 9 As a robustness check for the estimate of the real exchange rate gap we also estimate the risk premium in the uncovered interest parity (UIP). 10 Filtering of the ination series with the Hodrick-Prescott lter gives us, of course, a dierent ination gap than those calculated as deviations from the typically constant ocial targets, in particular during inationary or disinationary periods. The key benet of a time-varying ination target is that we are more likely to capture an eective and/or credible ination objective as opposed to a publicly announced but noncredible one. The credibility problem has been severe in some of sample ination-targeting countries, such as Ghana or Indonesia. Ireland (2007) provided evidence in favor of a slowly evolving latent monetary policy objective, see also Castelnuovo, Greco, and Raggi (2008) for a literature review. We use the same calibration and estimation procedures for the CDR methodology to obtain the rst two latent factors the level and slope in all sample countries.
11 Visual observation of these factors in the right-hand column in Furthermore, visually comparing the macroeconomic developments with the latent factors suggests the presence of correlation, albeit at varying leads and lags. We explore these links in the next section.
Results
The yield curves generally follow ination and output gap developments, with the results for our advanced countries essentially mimicking the ndings 11 For the estimation details see the online Appendix in Bulí°and Vl£ek, forthcoming. 12 ©International Monetary Fund. Not for Redistribution by Ang and others (2011) (see Table 2 ). Intuitively, this nding can be understood as nding statistically signicant coecients for ination and the output gap in an estimated policy reaction function.
The background results for the individual countries are summarized in Appendix C, Table 3 . In summary, in 11 out of 16 countries interest rates are linked to ination, based on the impulse response evidence. A link between interest rates and output is found in 11 countries. The link between interest rates and the exchange rate gap has been found in ten countries. We discuss country-specic results in the next section and the full VAR results are presented in an online appendix. 12 Appendix E presents selected robustness checks. Source: Authors' calculations; see Table 3 for individual-country results.
We prefer to express these quasi policy reaction functions in qualitative terms for two reasons. First, there is no obvious way of aggregating the level and slope shifts into a summary policy rate term.
13 Second, given the wide estimated condence bands, point estimates would give a false sense of precision.
Country-Specic Results
The primacy of the price stability objective implies that current-period (and recent past) ination precedes the current-period latent factors. We expect 12 See http://ales-bulir.wbs.cz/results_var_based_analysis_nal.pdf 13 Following Taylor (1993) , the policy reaction function is typically expressed as policy rate = neutral rate + a*inf lation gap + β * output gap + ... 13 ©International Monetary Fund. Not for Redistribution statistically signicant impulse responses; either sizable and negative for the second factor and nil for the rst, or sizable and positive for the rst factor and nil for the second, or both sizable with the correct signs (see Appendix C for details). We supplement the population-type evidence from the VARs with sample-type evidence from the Pearson correlation coecients, see Appendix D, Figure 6 , 7, 8, and 9.
First, the advanced IT countries the Czech Republic, Israel, and Sweden react to ination and output developments either through the second latent factor or through both the rst and second latent factors, and given their freely oating exchange rates all but the Czech Republic ignore exchange rate misalignments. The shapes of the impulse responses are at after t and t +1 and the estimated correlations are generally high, suggesting fast and robust reactions to macroeconomic innovations. The Czech yield curve appears to react one quarter faster to macroeconomic innovations than the Israeli or Swedish yield curves. In other words, Czech National Bank monetary policy seems to be more forward looking than that of the two other advanced countries. Furthermore, only in the Czech Republic, which has a strong exchange rate channel, do we nd some evidence of a link between interest and exchange rates.
Second, the results for the other IT countries are more varied and generally weaker than those for the advanced ITers. These countries appear to react more often through the level factor to ination and the output gap. In addition, we fail to nd evidence of an ination-to-interest rate link in Georgia and Ghana. All of them appear to react to the exchange rate, consistent with Frankel (2019).
Third, the results for multiple-objective and money-targeting central banks are even more varied. We fail to nd evidence of the price stability objective in Malaysia, Nigeria, and Rwanda. Only in Kenya do we nd links to both ination and the business cycle.A link to exchange rates is found only in Kenya, Morocco, Nigeria, and Rwanda, all formally money-targeting countries.
Robustness Checks
These ndings remain unchanged after a broad range of robustness checks, the results of which are available on demand. First, in addition to the Hodrick-Prescott lter, we apply the Hamilton (2017) lter and obtain results with similar signs. However, the level of statistical signicance is gen-14 ©International Monetary Fund. Not for Redistribution erally lower than that of the HP lter-based results. Second, we identify the risk-neutral rate in the CDR approach in order to eliminate the eect of the risk premium on the long end of the yield curve. Third, we also experiment with alternative calibrations of l in the Hodrick-Prescott lter to reect the suggested higher smoothness to capture the nancial cycle, again obtaining broadly similar results. For these two robustness checks see Appendix E, 
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Source: Authors' calculations. 22 ©International Monetary Fund. Not for Redistribution C Impulse Response Results for Individual Countries Table 3 summarizes our assessment of the individual-country VARs that form the basis for Table 2 in the main text. We denote by X each instance where we cannot reject at a p-value of 0.2 the null hypothesis of a link between the macroeconomic variables and the latent factors. X denotes instances where (i) we nd the expected sign of the impulse response between the past macroeconomic variables and the latent factors and (ii) the estimate is statistically signicant at a p-value of 0.2 at the horizon from t to t+2;
indicates that either no statistically signicant impulse response is found or the response sign is going in the opposite direction to economic theory. 
D Correlation Results for Individual Countries
We show both individual-country sample Pearson correlation coecients and correlograms. Regarding the former, we denote by X instances where the correlation coecient has the expected sign and its absolute value is larger than 0.3 ( Table 4 ). 15 Regarding the latter, we read the charts (Figure 6, 7 15 Although there are no critical points for correlation coecients, Doucouliagos (2011) estimated that partial correlations bigger than ± 0.3 can be deemed to be satisfactorily large. X denotes instances where (i) we nd the expected sign of the correlation coecient between past macroeconomic variables and the latent factor, and (ii) the correlation coecient is statistically signicant;
indicates either no statistically signicant correlation found or the relationship is going in the opposite direction to economic theory. Notes: Each correlogram plots the t-period estimate of the sample Pearson correlation coecient between the latent factors, denoted as DL1 and DL2, and three lags and three leads for detrended ination, the output gap (Y Gap), and the real exchange rate gap (Z Gap). 
GHA: DL2(t)<--> Var(t+shift)
Source: Authors' calculations. Notes: Each correlogram plots the t-period estimate of the sample Pearson correlation coecient between the latent factors, denoted as DL1 and DL2, and three lags and three leads for detrended ination, the output gap (Y Gap), and the real exchange rate gap (Z Gap). Notes: Each correlogram plots the t-period estimate of the sample Pearson correlation coecient between the latent factors, denoted as DL1 and DL2, and three lags and three leads for detrended ination, the output gap (Y Gap), and the real exchange rate gap (Z Gap). 
SWE: DL2(t)<--> Var(t+shift)
Source: Authors' calculations. Notes: Each correlogram plots the t-period estimate of the sample Pearson correlation coecient between the latent factors, denoted as DL1 and DL2, and three lags and three leads for detrended ination, the output gap (Y Gap), and the real exchange rate gap (Z Gap). 
ZAF: DL2(t)<--> Var(t+shift)
Source: Authors' calculations.
Assumptions and to the Removal of the Risk Premium?
Of the robustness checks mentioned previously, we report the results for the nancial cycle and the removal of the risk premium. Interestingly, the only three countries where we observe materially dierent results for both robustness checks are Nigeria, Rwanda, and Tanzania: in Nigeria, the risk-free estimates and the smoother nancial-cycle trend in the short rates newly identify some output and exchange rate gap links; however, we lose such links in the latter two countries.
Regarding the former robustness check, we tested the link between macroeconomic innovations and the yield curves using the estimate of the risk-free rate, that is, we removed the estimate of the risk premium as identied in the CDR methodology. While we nd that the estimate of the risk-free rate results in dierent level/slope links for some countries, it does not change the thrust of our results.
Regarding the latter robustness check, it has been pointed out that nancial cycles are longer in general than business cycles and, if this is the case, the optimal l might be higher. We replicate Table 3 in the main body of the paper with l set equal to 400,000, a value recommended by the BIS for the identication of nancial cycles. This alternative detrending technique again does not qualitatively change the results. We fail to nd empirical support for the hypothesis that the cross-country similarity of our results is driven by high public debt limiting movements in short-and long-term rates. In principle, dicult-to-nance public debt levels should impose high risk premiums, osetting the policy rate innovations. At what level scal dominance will start playing such a role is, of course, subject to debate. To this end, we compare the sample-country debt-to-GDP ratios with the commonly used benchmark of 60 percent ( Figure 10 ). 
Most
